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Abstract
At the LHC the machine protection and interlock sys-
tems will be major players that need to keep track with the
evolution of the machine in terms of beam energy and in-
tensity. At the start of beam commissioning, many protec-
tion systems will already be partially commissioned. This
presentation will outline the state of the various protection
systems at the start of beam commissioning and discuss
how to bring up one system after another as the beam in-
tensity and energy is increased..
INTRODUCTION
The beam intensities foreseen for nominal LHC opera-
tion exceed by far the damage [1] and quench levels of the
machine elements. A summary of the present knowledge
of damage levels is given in Table 1. A pilot bunch should
not quench the magnets and a beam with 43 bunches of
3 − 4 × 1010 protons that is foreseen for initial operation
should be below damage level for common metals (Cu) at
injection. It is however clear from the table that damage
levels will be quickly reached at 7 TeV and for higher in-
tensities. The machine protection systems must therefore
be commissioned at a very early stage.
Table 1: Beam intensities and damage levels at the LHC.
Energy Intensity Comment
450 GeV 5× 109 no quench
450 GeV 1× 1012 ’safe beam’
450 GeV 5× 1012 damage level for Cu
450 GeV 3× 1013 no damage to collimators
7 TeV ≈ 1010 damage level for Cu
7 TeV ≈ 1012 damage to collimators
COMMISSIONING STRATEGY
The machine protection systems of the LHC must be
commissioned as soon as possible in order to gain experi-
ence and confidence with such a complex and critical sys-
tem. With the low beam intensities to be expected dur-
ing the commissioning phase, interlocks should not pose
any problems, and if they do, corrective actions must be
taken as soon as possible and before the intensity can be in-
creased. Furthermore the concept of Safe Beam that will be
used within the interlock system makes it possible to mask
problematic interlocks during the commissioning phase.
A significant amount of machine protection and beam
setup can be made in parallel, with the interlock systems
following progress of the machine. But dedicated peri-
ods of interlock tests must be foreseen near certain crit-
ical thresholds. Typical threshold are : first ramp, first
squeeze, injection of batches (72 and more bunches), etc.
The thresholds and tests must be defined by the MPWG.
Interlock Testing
Due to the much higher risk of damage at the LHC com-
pared to the SPS, a more rigorous approach to interlock
testing must be enforced.
• Predefined checklists must be established.
• Interlock tests must be performed in dedicated time
slots.
• The tests must be properly documented (date, persons
present, machine conditions, results, etc).
Such test procedure will be evaluated from 2006 onwards
at the SPS.
A primary functional test for an interlock channel consist
in generating appropriate conditions to trigger the interlock
in order to verify a correct reaction. For the case of a beam
loss monitor, a local beam loss must be produced and the
test is successful if the loss monitor detects the beam loss
and triggers an interlock. Such a basic test is of course
mandatory, but is not sufficient at the LHC.
At the LHC an additional step must be made in terms of
interlock testing by provoking controlled equipment fail-
ures to ensure that the protection systems are able to han-
dle the fault. Example of failures are a warm D1 separation
dipole powering failure, a powering failure in an entire in-
sertion, etc. Since the number of possible faults is very
large, it is the responsibility of the MPWG to propose rep-
resentative tests to be carried out at the LHC. The presence
of some beam is necessary to trace back with post-mortem
data that the protection systems reacted indeed as expected
and provide adequate protection.
MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM ON
DAY 1
The interlock systems involved in machine protection of
the LHC are:
• The powering interlock system.
– Protects the super-conducting magnets.
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– Interfaces to the quench protection, power con-
verter and energy extraction systems.
– Millisecond reaction times.
• The beam interlock system.
– Protects the entire machine against beam in-
duced damage.
– Interfaces to all systems involved in machine
protection.
– Microsecond reaction times.
• The SPS extraction interlock system.
– Protects the LHC against beam induced damage
at injection.
– Interfaces to SPS extraction, transfer line and
LHC injection elements.
– Microsecond reaction times.
– Based on the same hardware than the LHC beam
interlock system.
The powering interlock system will be commissioned
during the LHC hardware commissioning period that fin-
ishes before beam operation. This system will therefore be
entirely operational.
Since a number of client systems interfacing to the beam
interlock system cannot be fully commissioned without
beam, the beam interlock system cannot be entirely oper-
ational when the first beam is injected into the LHC. All
links between the beam interlock system and its clients as
well as the beam-independent functionalities of the client
systems can however be commissioned before the first
beam.
The extraction interlock systems of the SPS for TI2 and
TI8 will be (re)commissioned before first beam is injected
into the LHC. Those systems can therefore be made opera-
tional. It must however be noted that some interlocks from
LHC injection elements that are part of the extracted inter-
lock systems may require beam to be fully commissioned.
Since it is expected that the first injected pilot bunches
may not even reach the end of an arc, the usefulness of the
interlock systems is very ’limited’. In particular the beam
dump will not yet be commissioned with beam and will be
’out of reach’ of the beams. There are however two services
that the interlock systems can provide on day-1 :
• The SPS interlock system must ensure that the beam
intensity never exceeds a preset level.
• The LHC interlock system must provide an extrac-
tion inhibit to the SPS in case of an evident equip-
ment failure to stop beam injection (powering prob-
lem, quench, etc).
COMMISSIONING SEQUENCE
Towards a Circulating Beam
The first phase of commissioning of each LHC ring con-
sists in threading the beams around the machine and estab-
lishing a closed orbit [2]. The beam will consist of a single
bunch, with intensity in the range of 5 × 109 to 4 × 1010.
During this period the main machine protection activities
are :
• Commissioning of the beam dump with pilot bunches
(synchronization, trajectory in the dump channel).
• Beam loss observation.
• Rough collimators setting up.
Consolidation at Injection
In the second phase the machine conditions at injection
must be improved (tunes, chromaticity, non linearities), the
beta-beating must be brought under control, the aperture
must be explored. The beam intensity must be safe, i.e.
<≈ 1012 protons. During this phase the main machine
protection activities are :
• Understanding and ’control’ of the aperture. This
issue is related to the orbit quality and the beta-
beating [3]
• Beam loss observation and threshold tuning. A con-
trolled quench of a magnet may be foreseen to validate
the BLM thresholds. The BLM interlocks will be ac-
tivated and tested.
• Collimator positioning with coarse interlocking [4].
• Commissioning of the Safe Beam Parameters is
started.
• Post-mortem system tests with beam instrumentation
data.
Ramp and Squeeze
The commissioning of the ramp and squeeze must be
performed with single bunches, with an intensity in the
range of 5 × 109 to 4 × 1010 protons. During this phase
the main machine protection activities are :
• Commissioning of the beam dump at different energy
steps, most likely ’on the fly’.
• Beam loss observation and threshold tuning as a func-
tion of the energy.
• Collimator and absorber positioning.
• Continuation of the Safe Beam Parameters commis-
sioning.
At the end of this phase, essentially all the protection sys-
tems will have been commissioned with beams of low in-
tensity.
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Operation with 43 on 43 bunches
Operation with 43 bunches of 3 − 4 × 1010 protons per
beam is just at the limit of the safe beam at injection where
this operation mode should not pose too serious problems
provided the machine aperture is under control.
At 7 TeV the intensity is well above damage level for
metals, but the collimators will be able to withstand a total
beam loss unto the jaws. Given the large bunch spacing and
the ’low’ intensity a simple two-stage collimation setup is
sufficient [4]. Since there is no crossing angle with this
scheme, the aperture in the triplet is not critical and the po-
sition tolerances on the absorbers (in particular the TCDQ)
can be relaxed.
At this stage of operation all interlocks must be opera-
tional, with the possible exception of the fast beam current
decay monitor and the fast beam position change interlock.
CONCLUSION
At the time of first beam injection into the LHC the status
of the three interlock systems is the following :
• LHC powering interlock system : operational.
• SPS extraction interlock system : operational.
• LHC beam interlock system : partly operational.
All interlocks must be activated as soon as possible in or-
der to gain confidence and experience. Given the large risk
of operation at the LHC (except at injection with low in-
tensity), more formal testing of interlocks must be put in
place. This effort must be coordinated by the MPWG.
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